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Special Issue Editors’ Introduction: Observing Autocracies from the Ground Floor* 
J. Paul Goode, University of Bath  
Ariel I. Ahram, Virginia Tech University 
 
Writers, artists, and teachers have long understood that repressive governments 
manipulate the ways we understand them, twisting knowledge and education to their own 
ends. In seeking to justify their existence, the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and Mao’s 
China (to name a few) generated national histories, educational systems, and scientific 
doctrines in line with official ideologies. While social scientists initially emphasized 
terror as the “lifeblood” of the totalitarian system (Fainsod, 1953; Friedrich & Brzezinski, 
1956; Gleason 1995), state violence invariably waned over time. Perhaps more relevant 
to understanding totalitarian rule, writers like Franz Kafka, George Orwell, Yevgeny 
Zamyatin, and Arthur Koestler saw distortions of history, empirical facts, and truth as 
intimately connected with a stultifying, repressive bureaucracy that celebrated its own 
image while punishing individuals who publically disclosed the ways it really worked. 
Reflecting on their own life experiences, Eastern European dissidents like Vaclav Havel 
and György Konrád produced powerful accounts of individuals as isolated and powerless 
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within communist governments that twisted and distorted the production of information 
about politics, leaving individuals isolated and seemingly powerless.  
Few contemporary regimes, save perhaps the People’s Republic of North Korea, 
go to these same lengths to manufacture a totalitarian version of history. Rather, now, at 
the “end of the history” (Fukuyama, 2006), democracy is the only acceptable façade left 
standing (Jowitt, 1992, Levitsky & Way, 2010). Authoritarian and semi-authoritarian 
regimes all offer at least the pretense of abiding by democratic norms while seeking to 
obscure or obfuscate their autocratic tendencies. Still, these practices occupy a peculiar 
bind spot for political scientists. It is not that social scientists are gullible, naïve, or 
partisan. It is that the discipline that emerged within and for the study of democratic 
regimes, and has been committed to a positivist, objective notion of scientific truth has 
had a hard time grappling with the possibilities that the ‘truths’ emerging from 
authoritarian settings might have different valances.   
Even as political science once again embraces the study of authoritarianism, then, 
it remains difficult to get scholars to talk about the challenges they confront in studying 
authoritarian regimes. This is not just a difficulty faced by scholars working and living in 
authoritarian regimes. Social scientists are more likely to interpret political challenges to 
social scientific research in terms of methodological challenges: after all, surely data and 
research methods have little to do with regime. And yet, much of the past study of 
authoritarianism (and totalitarianism before it) involved devising ways of coping with the 
limitations imposed by closed regimes.  Seemingly simple tasks—obtaining visas, 
conducting interviews or surveys, accessing archives, and observing informal processes 
out on the street—become obstacles.  
Certainly, these challenges exist in the study of democratic regimes, as well. The 
scientific study of politics emerged within democracies for the study of democracies. 
Despite the obvious constraints that authoritarianism poses for those seeking to study it, 
scholars must still articulate those challenges involved in studying authoritarianism 
within the discipline of democracy. The penalty for failing to do so is to risk one’s 
research appearing unintelligible if not unscientific. Nevertheless, there are systematic 
ways that authoritarian regimes create methodological and ethical dilemmas for scholars. 
Dismissing the link between particular dilemmas and authoritarianism is akin to 
explaining the difficulty of navigating a cluttered room in the dark without 
acknowledging the absence of light as an underlying cause. To extend the analogy, the 
absence of light may seem insignificant or even imperceptible for those already familiar 
with the terrain. Some may even deny the darkness exists, blaming it instead on the 
observer’s biased views. Those encountering the room for the first time might embrace 
the absence of light as the room’s essential characteristic. Others, more deductively 
inclined, might construct statistical models of the room’s characteristics from afar, 
relying on those already familiar with the terrain to collect their data or examining similar 
rooms in similar houses to infer its dimensions. Regardless of approach, all may 
acknowledge the absence of light but treat it as a background condition that lacks causal 
relation to the difficulty of getting around the clutter.  
Political scientists’ interest in authoritarianism has been growing in recent years. 
A quick assessment of recent papers presented at APSA shows steady increase in those 
with the keywords “authoritarian” and “authoritarianism” and a corresponding decline in 
those concerning “democracies” and “democratization” (FIGURE 1). Similarly, a search 
of journal abstracts shows the stagnation and decline of research on democratization and 
the concomitant ascent of studies on authoritarianism (FIGURE 2). With the recent 
resurgence of interest in authoritarianism, political scientists updated well-worn practices 
of elaborating the logic of authoritarian rule. In past studies of authoritarian and 
totalitarian regimes, scholars often focused on discrete, observable configurations of 
power and the operations of formal institutions in authoritarian regimes. In the 
contemporary literature on the “new authoritarianism,” scholars once more rely upon 
these visible institutional elements of authoritarian rule. There is a genuine puzzle, of 
course, in dictators’ reliance on formally democratic institutions that would seem to 
diminish their personal and informal power. However, the new generation of scholars 
depart from past literatures in using these visible elements in deductive fashion to 
produce formal models of elite behavior and to generate quantitative data for statistical 
testing (Gandhi, 2008; Schedler, 2013; Svolik 2012).  Such works are not lacking in 
methodological sophistication, but they remain vulnerable to the basic problem that the 
formal and public operations of authoritarian institutions are often secondary to the secret 
or informal political processes.  In the end, a deductive approach can only test the 
implications of an argument about the internal political machinations of authoritarian 
regimes in terms of their correlation with regime stability or survival rather than testing 
the argument through direct observation. There is a deep problem of endogeneity when 
examining the public fact of dictatorial regimes. As a recent review article on 
“Democratic Authoritarianism” notes, there remains “a dearth of empirical evidence” and 
an “inability to distinguish cause from effect.” The article concludes that it is “unlikely to 
ever provide evidence for the effect of these institutions on par with the kind of evidence 
provided about institutions in advanced democracies, and no one should expect it to” 
(Brancati, 2014: 323-324) Do, as a growing genre of scholarship suggests, legislatures 
make dictatorships more robust and enduring? Or do only robust and enduring 
dictatorships adopt legislative facades?   
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
If we were to proceed in similar fashion to those who use game theory to generate 
testable hypotheses about authoritarianism, would we be able to make some general 
deductions about the relationship of various kinds of authoritarian regimes to research 
methods and fieldwork? An underlying concern of game theoretic approaches is to 
circumvent the problem of preference falsification. Preference falsification refers to an 
individual’s public expression of views that differ from their privately held views or 
opinions. While one potentially finds preference falsification wherever researchers ask 
sensitive or controversial questions, it is of particular concern in authoritarian states. As 
Kuran (1995: 1538) noted, “the very forces that discourage truthful expression [in non-
democratic regimes] also inhibit the collection and dissemination of opinion data.”  
Consider, for instance, the problem of determining the extent of preference falsification 
among interview respondents in a dictatorship. Respondents may conceal their opinions 
about the regime or its politics for fear of violence, repression, or other repercussions, 
possibly owing to concerns about regime surveillance or simply ordinary paranoia. Yet as 
long as we are focused on connecting the propensity to falsify one’s preferences with the 
regime’s institutional characteristics, the psychological mechanism is not relevant. 
Hence, a deductive approach might be considered superior to fieldwork approaches 
involving direct contact with respondents.  
Much work in this tradition presents authoritarian regimes in terms of substantive, 
generalizable differences: degrees of state capacity, presence of legislatures or multiparty 
systems, quality and availability of independent media, access to global capital flows, 
internet access and censorship, availability or tolerance of organized opposition, degrees 
of ethnic diversity, varieties of territorial cleavages, access to higher education, and so 
forth. On one hand, this is quite a useful way to avoid the temptation of essentializing 
autocracies in terms of national stereotypes (such as the idea of a cultural disposition 
toward dictatorship). However, the latter categories are often derivative of state capacity, 
while assessments of state capacity tend to be inconsistent and contested. Among the 
most common indicators of state capacity, large budgets and bureaucracies do not make 
states efficacious. The massive costs of constructing Olympics facilities for Beijing in 
2008 and Sochi in 2014, particularly when compared to other Olympics games held in 
democratic states, serve less as indicators of state capacity than endemic corruption and 
extraordinary security burdens. This is especially evident when mapping the total costs of 
mega-events like the Olympics against host countries’ Freedom House ratings (FIGURE 
3).1  
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
In the same vein, it might be theoretically attractive to deduce that autocracies 
with high capacity are most likely to induce preference falsification, as high state 
capacity ought to translate into the ability to reliably repress one’s citizens (and citizens’ 
awareness of that capacity). Repression can take a number of forms. Short of the resort to 
outright violence, a high capacity state can withhold patronage or use bureaucratic 
harassment to induce compliance. However, citizens in low capacity autocracies may 
engage in preference falsification because (to paraphrase Weber) the state fails to 
exercise a monopoly on the legitimate means of violence and coercion, leaving them 
extremely vulnerable to local caciques, warlords, or crime bosses. Citizens’ uncertainty 
about the state may be matched by a regime’s uncertainty about citizens’ loyalties (or its 
own subordinates and local representatives, for that matter), such that rumor and 
suspicion can become powerful forces. Under such circumstances, the state may opt to 
repress frequently and violently, especially if one assumes that low capacity autocracies 
rely more readily on despotic than infrastructural power (Mann 1988). In both cases, 
then, one might reasonably expect all citizens to engage in preference falsification 
regardless of the degree of state capacity. Turning to elites (opposition leaders, business 
elites, or regime subordinates), one easily comes to a similar conclusion: there is every 
incentive for the interviewee to engage in preference falsification when the potential risks 
of repression are more real and personal for the respondent than the abstract scientific 
benefits for interviewer.  
In treating respondents within authoritarian regimes as interested actors to explain 
their engaging in preference falsification, one should also consider the circumstances 
under which it would be in their interest not to falsify their preferences. Without 
awareness of context gained from immersion in the field and the corresponding sense of 
the “on stage” and “off stage” differences in a community’s life (Kuran 1995: 1542), the 
interviewer potentially becomes the unwitting agent of the respondent. One set of 
circumstances may conceivably be conjured by survey techniques that remove any 
repercussions for the respondent, such as list, evaluation, and randomization experiments 
that ensure respondents’ anonymity. However, verification of findings from these kinds 
of studies is particularly rare, as Ryan Sheely points out in this special edition.  
But when is preference falsification unlikely? Deductive approaches tend to wave 
away these questions, essentially positing that everyone engages in preference 
falsification in some form or fashion. Politicians lie because they can (Mearsheimer, 
2011). Everyday citizens lie because they must. Though authoritarian institutions differ in 
characteristics, there is no deductive means to tell when and how they might induce such 
obscurant behavior.  
 
THE QUALITATIVE, INDUCTIVE CORNERSTONE IN THE STUDY OF 
AUTHORITARIANISM 
This special edition seeks to highlight and explore the critical role of qualitative, 
fieldwork-based research in the study of authoritarianism. It builds upon a symposium 
featured in the APSA Comparative Democratization newsletter in 2011 and benefits from 
the insights yielded by that experience. New techniques for studying authoritarian 
regimes quantitatively are proliferating, including social media analysis (King, Pan, & 
Roberts, 2013), compiling biographical databases (Shih, Adolph, and Liu, 2012), survey 
experiments (Frye, 2006; Brader & Tucker, 2009), and triangulation (Pepinsky, 2009).  
Still, the basic tasks of field research are taken for granted and often undervalued. In fact, 
much of the latest quantitative and deductive, formal model based approaches to 
authoritarian essentially stands on the shoulders of qualitative research that frequently 
goes unmentioned. Take the widely acclaimed selectorate theory advanced by Bruce 
Bueno de and others (de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Marrow, 2006; Morrow, de 
Mesquita, Siverson, & Smith, 2008; de Mesquita, 2006). The idea that authoritarian 
regimes focus on trying to establish “winning coalitions” in a similar fashion as 
parliamentary democracies has a clear elegance. Coupling a deductive model with 
effective use of cross-national quantitative analysis shows support for these hypotheses. 
But much of the empirical data used to test the key hypotheses came from surveys sent 
out to individual country experts to evaluate the size and relative openness of political 
regimes.2 Without some attention to potential limitations in the underlying inductive 
investigation, then, the entire edifice of selectorate theory is questionable. 
Similar to recent works examining research in war zones and other dangerous 
locations (Sriram, King, Mertus, Martin-Ortega, & Herman, 2009; Lee-Treweek & 
Linkogle, 2000, Dolnik, ed., 2013) we have asked scholars to reflect on their field-based 
research and to consider how methods and context met in the course of their research.  
Every one of these researchers described a measure of friction—if not an outright 
collision—between what they assumed to be methodological best practices and what was 
feasible in the authoritarian situation. Investigating authoritarian regimes, similar to 
investigating countries in the midst of civil war, forces difficult choices upon the 
researchers about personal safety and the safety of informants. A chilling illustration was 
provided when Alexander Sodiqov, a political science PhD student from the University 
of Toronto, was arrested in Tajikistan and reportedly charged with treason after 
interviewing an opposition leader (“A Scholar Faces Treason Charges,” 2014). Even 
more disturbing was the brutal murder of Giulio Regeni, a PhD student from Cambridge 
University, in Cairo in early 2016. Observers linked the manner of his death to state 
security and speculated that it was related to his research into labor matters, or possibly to 
his writing for an opposition newspaper under a pseudonym (Kirchgaessner, 2016). Yet, 
the response (there are no real solutions) to these problems are seldom discussed in the 
open, much less formally incorporated into methodological training. 
More than simply comprising a practical handbook or field manual that compiles 
the way scholarship on and in authoritarianism might actually done, this edition probes 
how authoritarianism itself conditions and constrains research. Embracing reflexivity 
means recognizing two crucial power differentials that define research on authoritarian 
regimes. The first exists between scholars and research subjects. It is defined by the 
capriciousness of regimes, the risks of coercion or intimidation, and the consequent 
possibilities of self-censorship, either on the part of respondents or the scholar herself.  
The second differential exists within the scholarly community. It is defined by 
institutionalization of disciplinary norms and standards that prioritize certain kinds of 
research in certain kinds of places, while marginalizing other techniques and other 
geographic foci. Without such a reflexive assessment, scholars risk becoming partisans, 
for example, by presenting one-sided data drawn only from opposition figures or 
unintentionally replicating the agendas of state agencies or nongovernmental 
organizations.  
Given the variety of experience and research priorities displayed, we have resisted 
the urge to impose a single unified rubric that defines authoritarianism and its various 
subsidiary concepts. Authoritarianism, like democracy, is already a conceptual and 
taxonomical morass. Efforts to create standardized and general definitions of various 
regime types, while undoubtedly useful from a quantitative perspective, are prone also to 
obscure certain critical factors in regimes that can affect how research is conducted. The 
stakes in the debate about “electoral authoritarianism” versus “illiberal democracy,” are 
largely about the semantics and connotations and are often divorced from issues of 
empirics and denotation. Rather, we have invited each contributor to evaluate how their 
particular regime has been treated in the literature and to reflect on how distinctive 
characteristics of the regime constrained or enabled certain kinds of research practices. 
For virtually every case, one finds contentious debates over the appropriate regime 
category. Moreover, regime instability, war and revolution further compound these 
debates. Even when stable, nominally democratic regimes emerge from authoritarian 
rule, the lingering influence of authoritarian institutions and practices remains a going 
concern that complicates the assessment of democratic consolidation.  
We further buck the tendencies dominant in quantitative and deductive modes of 
inquiry by organizing the issue explicitly around regional clusters. There is, of course, a 
long-standing tension in comparative politics between those pursuing global 
generalization and those who consider themselves area specialists (Bates, 1997; Ahram, 
2011). While the tables may have turned in favor of the former in recent decades, 
(Mahoney, 2007) we find that the study of authoritarianism in particular, the emergences 
of general categorizations and concepts often are grounded in area-specific forms of 
inquiry. According to Geddes’s own effort to create a general taxonomy of authoritarian 
sub-types, militarist regimes were typical of Latin American (bureaucratic) 
authoritarianism and personalist regimes of Africa (Geddes, 2003). One finds hybrid 
regimes throughout much of the post-Soviet space with a concentration of personalist 
regimes in the Caucasus and Central Asia (Hale, 2005). Rentier and personalist 
autocracies are commonly found in the Middle East and North Africa, with the Arab 
Spring drawing particular attention to the apparent “monarchical advantage” (Menaldo, 
2012; Yom & Gause, 2012). This decision is also in line with the reflexive bent of the 
effort. Most scholars in comparative politics—especially those who endeavor to spend 
long time in the field—begin their work with an interest in a country or region, not a 
research topic such as authoritarianism. Robert Bates, for instance, is now primarily 
associated with the pursuit of generalized theory, formal modelling, and eschewing area 
studies boundaries. Yet, as he told an interviewer, a trip to Africa while he was in high 
school set his career path: “I decided that going to Africa was the most important thing 
I’d ever done in my life and I wanted a career that would get me back to Africa as often 
as possible” (Munck & Snyder, eds., 2007: 506). Though Bates sits uneasy with 
identifying himself as an Africa area specialist, he still maintains that field research itself 
is essential (Munck and Snyder, eds., 2007: 535-537). 
Overall, we hope that organizing the edition in terms of region lends it an 
intuitive, real world dimension. The articles reflect scholars’ experiences working around 
the globe—in itself, a practical resource for current and future scholars researching those 
areas—and across different times. In some cases, contributors’ observations and 
recommendations contradict those presented in other articles. In our opinion, this reflects 
the extent to which conducting fieldwork under authoritarian conditions amplifies both 
scholarly judgment and the spontaneous or contingent circumstances that can produce 
breakthroughs in fieldwork experiences. However, we also expected commonalities to 
emerge from the contributions which, when taken together, would yield some practical 
suggestions about the influence of authoritarian regimes on the production of knowledge 
about authoritarianism, as well as some practical suggestions for scholars anticipating 
fieldwork in these countries and those similar to them. 
The article by Ariel Ahram and Paul Goode elaborates these challenges by 
framing authoritarian regimes as self-conscious producers of ignorance (Ahram & Goode 
XXXX). An essential shared characteristic of all dictatorships is their use of bureaucratic 
obstruction, disinformation, or coercion to conceal their informal and formal operations. 
The article presents a range of ethical, practical, and methodological dilemmas that 
scholars face when studying authoritarian and hybrid regimes, concluding that adopting a 
reflexive approach to the study of authoritarianism can yield additional benefits for 
scholars grappling with authoritarian practices within democracies. 
Following on the concept of authoritarian regimes as producers of ignorance, 
Robert Barros’s article focuses on the problem of secrecy as policy (Barros XXXX). He 
draws particular attention to the possibilities and limits of using publicly available 
materials, what he calls “regime artifacts,” to step behind “the authoritarian veil of 
secrecy” and infer elite power relations from indirect sources. Using the example of 
decree-laws in Pinochet’s Chile, Barros notes that laws enacted by the junta provided a 
generally accurate sketch of the regime’s internal power structure, even as contemporary 
analysts mistakenly focused instead on Pinochet’s personal power. The Chilean example 
points to a broader difficulty of accurately contextualizing documentary evidence when 
authoritarian regimes work to conceal and suppress knowledge of elite decision-making. 
Ahram further probes the difficulties associated with state secrecy in examining 
the changes in Iraq studies following the overthrow of the Ba’th in 2003 (Ahram XXXX). 
The common problem of access to the Baathist regime led scholars to develop innovative 
approaches to the study of Iraq from afar.  Still, research on Iraq was relatively meager 
and detached from broader theoretical discussions in political science. Following regime 
change, opportunities for fieldwork and archival access increased dramatically, adding 
impetus to a new round of theoretically-engaged scholarship. Nevertheless, he draws 
attention to new challenges arising in the form of exposure to violent conditions, the 
limitations of embedded fieldwork, and the temptation to view current events in 
teleological terms.  
Shervin Malekzadeh’s article focuses on the ongoing problems of access in Iran 
and prescribes some guidelines for field research in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian 
countries (Malekzadeh XXXX). He notes that overly-rigid research designs are almost 
certain to fail when confronted with the capriciousness and opacity of authoritarian 
regimes, even when examining seemingly innocuous topics. Still, in this respect the 
researcher’s experience is likely to parallel that of an ordinary citizen’s in attempting to 
navigate networks of influence, regulation, and government control. This bottom-up 
perspective suggests that empathy with the challenges citizens face in everyday life may 
be a useful heuristic as a first step towards advancing one’s research.  
Goode’s article similarly considers the relationship between regime change and 
scholarship, focusing on studies of post-Soviet politics before and after the wave of Color 
Revolutions in the 2000s (Goode XXXX). While the scientific opening of the 1990s and 
the booming study of post-communist democratization generated a wealth of data and 
connected post-Soviet politics with broader theoretical studies in comparative politics, 
these sit uneasily with the retreat from democracy across Eurasia. Drawing on a decade 
of published research on politics in the former Soviet states, this article demonstrates that 
many scholars continued to draw from data and analytical frames that assumed 
democratization. By contrast, fieldwork-based studies were far more likely to 
acknowledge democratic reversals. Goode argues that scientific closure is not just a 
product of autocratization, but emerges at the intersection of authoritarianism and 
research cycles in comparative politics.  
Delving deeper into the relationship between political and scientific closure 
among post-Soviet regimes, Lawrence Markowitz observes that unofficial constraints on 
fieldwork in Central Asia rose steadily in the 2000s and hardened by mid-decade after a 
brief opening for scholars in the 1990s (Markowitz XXXX). He relates his experience 
conducting fieldwork in Uzbekistan to develop strategies for managing research design, 
data collection, and elite interviewing despite conditions of scientific closure. Through 
careful observation, the use of multiple forms of data from open sources, and awareness 
of opportunity, it becomes possible to observe even closed institutions like state security 
agencies.  
 Turning to the largest authoritarian state on the planet, Marie-Eve Reny points out 
that most published research on politics in China remains constrained by regime opacity 
and the complications associated with gaining access (Reny XXXX). Drawing on her 
prior fieldwork experience, she argues that these constraints may, in fact, present 
opportunities for comparativists willing to embrace informality as a strategy for 
conducting research. Such a strategy requires an awareness of political context, but it also 
potentially allows scholars to overcome regime-imposed restrictions. 
Cyanne Loyle assesses the kinds of constraints researchers are likely to face in 
closed regimes with reference to her field experiences in Rwanda (Loyle XXXX). She 
contends that scholars may overcome the difficulties of conducting research in closed 
regimes through a combination of local knowledge, creativity, and respect. It is 
particularly crucial that scholars learn to identify security risks to themselves, to 
respondents, and to one’s data. Loyle thus emphasizes the potential and the constraints of 
informality in research design and highlights specific ethical dilemmas associated with 
working in and on a local community. 
Ryan Sheely presents an ethnographic account of his own field work in Kenya 
(Sheely XXXX). Sheely highlights a long authoritarian shadow, originating in the 
bureaucratic practices of British colonialism and continuing through the post-colonial 
Kenya state. Even after Kenya’s (assumed) democratic opening in the mid-2000, the state 
maintains bureaucratic means to oversee—and obstruct—researchers in the field. The 
need to deal with profound power differentials that existed between himself as a white, 
American researcher and the various factions within his local community compelled him 
to take the novel and unexpected turn toward field experimentation as a way to mitigate 
at least some potential sources of bias.   
 In the concluding article, David Art argues that the stakes could not be higher in 
the quest for quality information about the inner workings of non-democratic regimes 
(Art XXXX). In synthesizing the findings of the previous articles, he emphasizes that 
studies of authoritarian regimes cannot be held to the same methodological standards as 
studies of democracies and urges scholars to “think more like detectives.” For this, 
scholars must be willing to adopt a historical stance and learn from studies of past 
authoritarian regimes. 
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1 The Freedom House (freedomhouse.org) “Freedom in the World” index rates countries 
on a scale of 1 (free) to 7 (not free).  
2 For information on the selectorate survey, see: 
<http://alexanderhamilton.as.nyu.edu/page/survey#q1>. 
3 Based on a keyword search of papers indexed in online APSA programs. There was no 
difference in results for “authoritarian,” “authoritarianism,” or “dictatorship.” However, 
“democracy” is so widely used across all subfields that it was virtually useless, while 
“democracies” and “democratization” appear to be the purview of Comparative Politics 
and (to a lesser extent) International Relations. 
4  "Cost of the Olympic Games, 2014; Müller, 2016. 
 
 
 
                                                            
